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I INTRODUCTION 
Rights based approaches to environmental conflict resolution should be 
viewed from the wider public law context. For example, Martin Loughlin 
maps the transition from a liberty focused constraint on law based on 
jurisdiction, to a rights focused approach to “intensive” judicial review 
based on legality. This sesismic shift away from common law 
(customary or practical) reasoning adopts a constitutional or statutory 
approach to describing liberties normatively using the “language of 
rights”, and builds upon the academic tradition that seeks to aid 
understanding by setting “forth the law as a coherent whole” and 
“reducing the mass of legal rules to an orderly series of principles”.1 
This paper will explore and critically analyse the effect of these trends 
on environmental conflict resolution from a trans-national New Zealand 
perspective. The underlying thesis of this paper is that the possibilities 
and tensions experienced by the courts in crafting a principled 
approach to human rights jurisprudence provides a transparent 
methodology for determing polycentric issues, and that there is a 
legitimate role for rights based approaches to resolving environmental 
conflict. 
Rights based approaches 
From New Zealand perspective, Christian Whata examined “the 
language of rights” in the context of special legislation designed to 
address the civil emergency resulting from the Canterbury 
                                            
1 Martin Loughlin “Rights Discourse and Public Law Thought in the United 
Kingdom” in GW Anderson (ed) Rights and Democracy: Essays in UK-
Canadian Constitutionalism (Blackstone Press, London, 1999) 195, 196, and 
206-207. 
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earthquakes, and the “crisis” regarding freshwater allocation in the 
Canterbury region due to the absence of an operative regional plan to 
guide decision-making in relation to resource consent applications 
under the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA), the principal 
environmental law statute in New Zealand.2 He noted the problem 
that:3 
 
… the ascendency of value or ethic speak in the last 20 or so years of 
RMA jurisprudence has come at an apparent price of rights speak. This 
has diminished the capacity to assert environmental rights per se as 
fundamental to the human condition, worthy of protection and 
enforceable. Conversely, the absence of clear treatment of 
environmental rights has meant that the full implications of legislative 
changes to the RMA have largely (until very recently) gone 
unchallenged in the face of laudable, outcome driven, executive policy. 
 
As a result, Whata identified “three kinds of environmental rights”, 
namely:4 
 
(1) International environmental rights, for example, the right to a clean 
environment, sustainable development, and the right to participate in 
environmental decision-making. 
(2) Property rights, for example, quiet enjoyment. 
(3) Cultural rights, for example, kaitiakitanga. 
 
Overall, he concluded that:5 
 
… in my view executive decision-making affecting the environment 
inevitably engages underlying environmental rights … For my part these 
rights are properly categorised as environmental rights at public law. 
They are not actionable per se, but are engaged when public law powers 
derogate from them in an appreciable way. They are an aspect of the 
rule of law. 
 
                                            
2 Christian Whata “Environmental Rights in a Time of Crisis: The Canterbury 
Experience” (11th Annual Salmon Lecture, Auckland, 25 October 2012). 
3 Whata (n 2) [8]. 
4  Whata (n 2) [20]. 
5 Whata (n 2) [85]. 
IUCN Academy of Environmental Law 14th Colloquium University of Oslo Norway 20-25 
June 2016  
 
 3 
Previously, Dinah Shelton observed from an international perspective 
that human rights and the environment differ from other legal 
approaches to resource management because they emphasise “each 
individual’s right to a certain quality of environment”.6 She noted that 
human rights law has distinct advantages in relation to environmental 
protection, namely, that human rights are “maximum claims on 
society” and clearly distinguishable from “mere policy choice”, and that 
constitutional guarantees will normally override other conflicting laws. 
Balanced against these “compelling” advantages are the disadvantages 
of a human rights approach to environmental protection, such as the 
anthropocentric focus on civil and political rights.7 Overall, she 
recognised that “a rights based approach” may radically affect how 
currently intractable issues are resolved, and she concluded that 
environmental rights must “include substantive … standards” in order 
to be effective.8 She noted that: 
 
Human rights exist to promote and protect human wellbeing, to allow 
the full development of each person and the maximization of the 
person’s goals and interests, individually and in community with others. 
This cannot occur without safe environmental milieu, ie air, water, and 
soil. Pollution destroys life and health and thus not only destroys the 
environment, but infringes human rights as well. 
 
These comments provide an insight into how currently intractable 
issues under the RMA (e.g. biodiversity protection on private land or 
competition for freshwater allocation) could be resolved. As noted by 
Whata, the statutory purpose in s 5 of the RMA provides for the 
promotion of the sustainable management of natural and physical 
resources. However, Malcolm Grant found that sustainable 
management is polycentric and that decision-making requires “trade-
offs” to be made. In particular, he observed that unless these choices 
are made via the RMA subsidiary policy statement and plan hierarchy 
                                            
6 Dinah Shelton “Human rights and the environment” in Trevor Daya-
Winterbottom (ed) The Salmon Lectures – Justice and the Environment 
(2nd edn, Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2012) 6-7. 
7 Shelton (n 6) 34-59. 
8  Shelton (n 6) 47. 
IUCN Academy of Environmental Law 14th Colloquium University of Oslo Norway 20-25 
June 2016  
 
 4 
envisaged by the statutory architecture, sustainable management does 
not operate as a guiding ethic.9 For example, in North Shore City 
Council v Auckland Regional Council,10 the Environment Court adopted 
an “overall broad judgment” approach to resolve conflicting 
considerations that has been consistently applied in subsequent cases, 
holding that:11 
 
The method of applying s 5 then involves an overall broad judgment of 
whether a proposal would promote the sustainable management of 
natural and physical resources.  That recognises that the Act has a 
single purpose … Such a judgment  allows for comparison of conflicting 
considerations and the scale or degree of them, and their relative 
significance or proportion in the final outcome. 
 
Effectively, absent any guidance from policy statements or plans the 
impact of the statutory purpose is “neutral”,12 and decision-makers are 
left free to make a “value judgment on behalf of the community”.13 
 
While the RMA provides a non-exclusive list of matters in s 6 and s 7 
that decision-makers are required to have regard to as examples of 
what may constitute sustainable management in particular cases, it is 
for note that these provisions are not expressly aligned with principles 
of international environmental law (e.g. protecting the habitat of exotic 
fish species such as trout and salmon) and that they were originally 
conceived by the Resource Management Law Reform process as an 
initial statement of matters of national policy.14 Arguably, this 
                                            
9 Malcolm Grant “Sustainable management: A sustainable ethic?” in Trevor 
Daya-Winterbottom (ed) Frontiers of Resource Management Law (Thomson 
Reuters, Wellington, 2012) 47. 
10 [1997] NZRMA 59. 
11 [1997] NZRMA 59 at 94. 
12 David Grinlinton “Contemporary Environmental Law in New Zealand” in 
Klaus Bosselmann and David Grinlinton (eds) Environmental Law for a 
Sustainable Society (New Zealand Centre for Environmental Law, Auckland, 
2002) 26-27. 
13 Watercare Services Ltd v Minhinnick [1998] NZRMA 113 (CA) at 124-125 
per Tipping J. 
14 Ministry for the Environment People, Environment, and Decision Making: 
the Government’s Proposals for Resource Management Law Reform 
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compounds the problem for decision-makers in terms of how they 
should approach exercising their wide discretion under the RMA. 
 
II INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS 
This section analyses the role of international environmental rights, for 
example, the right to a clean environment and the right to participate 
in environmental decision-making, in promoting the sustainable 
management of natural and physical resources. 
 
Right to a clean environment 
 
Some commentators have noted that cautious progress has been made 
toward establishing “an international human right to a clean 
environment”.15 There are also parallels between the development of 
human rights law and environmental law in international human rights 
instruments. For example, the Charter of the United Nations does not 
expressly “provide any support for the idea that a clean or healthy 
environment should … form part of those rights”.16 Nevertheless, such 
rights have been developed by subsequent United Nations declarations 
and treaties. For example, Principle 1 of the Declaration of the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm 
Declaration) 1972 states that: 
 
Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate 
conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of 
dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to protect 
and improve the environment for present and future generations. 
 
From a New Zealand perspective, Susan Glazebrook argued for a right 
to environmental quality. She found that procedural environmental 
                                                                                                             
(Ministry for the Environment, Wellington, 1988) 19; Philippe Sands and 
others Principles of International Environmental Law (3rd ed, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2012) 187-237. 
15  Malcolm N Shaw International Law (6th ed, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2008) at 847-848 
16  Philippe Sands and others Principles of International Environmental Law 
(3rd ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012) 777. 
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rights “enjoy greater support than substantive rights”,17 and noted that 
they are firmly based on civil and political rights and recognised 
constitutionally in a number of states. In contrast, Glazebrook 
observed that substantive rights to environmental quality are more 
closely related to economic and social rights, and that this may pose 
problems “in relation to the justiciability of these rights”.18 While 
carefully considering arguments against a substantive right to 
environmental quality, such as, the need to avoid a proliferation of 
rights and general difficulties about characterising this right, she relied 
on the opinion of Judge Weeramantry in the River Danube case where 
he concluded that environmental quality is the foundation for basic 
human rights, holding that it was:19 
… a vital part of contemporary human rights doctrine, for it is the sine 
qua non for the numerous human rights such as the right to health and 
the right to life itself. It is scarcely necessary to elaborate on this, as 
damage to the environment can impair and undermine all the human 
rights spoken of in the Universal Declaration and other human rights 
instruments. 
Overall, Glazebrook (like Shelton) considered that there is a critical 
need to link procedural environmental rights with substantive rights to 
environmental quality to make them fully effective. For example, she 
noted that procedural rights are “not sufficient” alone to guarantee 
environmental quality, and that failure to provide procedural rights 
inhibits “the ability to enjoy … substantive rights”.20 In particular, 
Glazebrook noted the close “cultural and spiritual” relationship between 
indigenous people and their land and other natural resources, and 
                                            
17 Susan Glazebrook “Human rights and the environment” in Paul Martin and 
others (eds) The Search for Environmental Justice (Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham 2015) 86. 
18 Glazebrook (n 17) 87. 
19 Case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) 
[1997] ICJ Rep 7, separate opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry at 91-
92. 
20 Glazebrook (n 17) 92; Shelton (n 6) 34-59. 
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found that ownership and responsibilities tend to be communal. This 
led her to observe that:21 
A healthy environment is intrinsically linked to the collective well-being 
of the people and traditional customs and customary laws are created in 
harmony with environmental sustainability. 
As a consequence, Glazebrook considered that a right to environmental 
quality “can be seen as quintessentially an indigenous right”.22 This led 
her to conclude that a right to environmental quality should be based 
on concept of guardianship that embraces intergenerational equity, 
and that it should be “separated” from substainable development “to 
ensure that human activity does not surpass the planet’s limited 
resources”.23 
Philippe Sands also noted the distinction between the substantive 
nature of economic, social and cultural rights in setting environmental 
standards, and the procedural nature of civil and political rights in 
providing (inter alia) for information rights and “access to judicial or 
administrative remedies”.24 He observed that “economic and social 
rights have traditionally been less well developed in practice”,25 but 
noted the creative approach by the courts to enforce “substantive 
environmental rights”.26 
 
For example, the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 (ECHR) 
imposes a positive obligation on states in the context of the right to life 
(art 2) to provide an “effective system” of regulating, supervising and 
controlling the adverse effects of “inherently dangerous” activities that 
pose a risk to human life, such as “toxic emissions” from industrial 
activities, or the management of “waste disposal sites”.27 However, art 
                                            
21 Glazebrook (n 17) 95. 
22 Glazebrook (n 17) 95. 
23 Glazebrook (n 17) 100. 
24  Sands (n 16) 780. 
25  Sands (n 16) 780. 
26  Sands (n 16) 782-785. 
27 Guerra v Italy (1998) 27 EHRR 212; Oneryildiz v Turkey (2005) 41 EHRR 
325; Clare Ovey and Robin CA White Jacobs and White The European 
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8 of the ECHR regarding the right to respect for private and family life 
has generally been used as the basis for substantive environmental 
rights. For example, art 8 has been successfully pleaded in relation to 
the unlawful waste management activities, and where affected persons 
were not given access to environmental information concerning a 
proposed chemical factory in a timely way.28 In contrast, complaints 
regarding noise from night flights at Heathrow Airport were not 
upheld.29 In those cases, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of 
Human Rights focused on whether the activities were lawful, whether 
there was any non-compliance with regulations, whether the proposed 
activity had been “tested” and found to be “compatible” with statutory 
requirements, and whether the activities were in the “interests” of the 
national economy.30 The Court declined to “accord” any “special status” 
to environmental rights, and focused on the need for proof of:31 
… the existence of a harmful effect on a person’s private or family 
sphere and not simply on the general deterioration of the environment. 
Overall, these cases demonstrate that the Court will have “regard to 
the balance of competing interests” when deciding whether the 
relevant regulatory authorities “have overstepped their margin of 
appreciation” that affords a degree of pragmatic deference to the need 
for efficient regulation in the modern state.32 
In contrast with art 2 of the ECHR, s 8 of the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 (NZBORA) provides for the right not to be deprived of 
life. Thus unlike art 2, s 8 does not expressly contain any positive 
obligation to protect life such as economic and social rights to “an 
adequate standard of living” or a clean environment. Notwithstanding 
                                                                                                             
Convention on Human Rights (4th ed Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) 
64. 
28 Lopez Ostra v Spain (1995) 20 EHRR 277; Guerra (n 27). 
29 Powell and Rayner v United Kingdom (1990) 12 EHRR 355; Hatton v United 
Kingdom (2003) 37 EHRR 611. 
30 Ovey and White (n 27) 286. 
31 Kyrtatos v Greece (2005) 40 EHRR 390, para 52. 
32 Ovey and White (n 27) 52-54. 
IUCN Academy of Environmental Law 14th Colloquium University of Oslo Norway 20-25 
June 2016  
 
 9 
more expansive interpretation of art 6 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR) on which the NZBORA is based, 
leading academic commentary has rejected any positive interpretation 
of s 8 because:33 
! Generating “broad positive duties” would be “unworkable”, 
open the flood gates to claims where the government failed 
to act, and require the courts to determine “non-justiciable 
controversies” regarding public policy and expenditure; 
! The NZBORA applies to all branches of government including 
the judiciary and public authorities, who should not be 
“placed under a free-standing” and “expansive” duty; and 
! The “idea” of positive obligations has been “firmly rejected” 
by the courts in the context of other “liberty rights” (i.e. 
thought, conscience and religious belief).34 
Expectations regarding privacy and property rights are governed by s 
21 of the NZBORA that prohibits unreasonable search or seizure. While 
the courts have been prepared to accept that “privacy” extends beyond 
“mere protection of property” (e.g. trespass) to include both individual 
or personal privacy and privacy regarding information,35 commentary 
on the NZBORA has also rejected any extension of the right against 
unreasonable seizure “divorced from a criminal justice orientation” to 
provide “a general guarantee of property rights”.36 As a result, s 21 of 
the NZBORA is considerably narrower than the corresponding ECHR 
rights noted above, both in terms of the text and its current 
interpretation. Beyond that, the courts have found that individual 
assertions regarding “reasonable expectations of privacy” should be 
                                            
33 Paul Rishworth and others, The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford 
University Press, Melbourne, Australia, 2003) 222. 
34 Mendelssohn v Attorney-General [1999] 2 NZLR 268 (CA) at 273; NZBORA, 
ss 13 and 15. 
35 R v Jefferies [1994] 1 NZLR 290 (CA); Rishworth 421. 
36 Rishworth (n 33) 430. 
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determined objectively by measuring them “against the values held ‘by 
the community at large’”.37 
Environmental decision-making has also intersected with the human 
rights and fundamental freedoms affirmed and protected by the 
NZBORA in 39 cases, including 7 cases focused on freedom of 
expression. For example, in Zdrahal v Wellington City Council,38 an 
abatement notice was served to require the removal of swastikas 
painted on the outside of a house, and the Environment Court applied 
the objective standard of the ordinary “reasonable person”, as the 
representative of the community, to determine whether they were 
“offensive and objectionable” under s 322 of the RMA. In doing so, the 
Court rejected an appeal based on s 14 of NZBORA, and held that 
protection of the environment and avoiding adverse effects warranted 
overriding the freedom to express beliefs and opinions that are 
offensive and objectionable and adversely affect the community. The 
Court found that imposing this restriction on these rights was 
reasonable and demonstrably justified. 
Right to participate in environmental decision-making 
Patricia Birnie and Alan Boyle, on the other hand, noted that 
“environmental rights do not fit neatly into any single category … of 
human rights”, but rather create an “enhanced status [for] 
environmental quality when balanced against competing objectives and 
other human rights, including the right to property”. They identified 
three countervailing arguments against establishing a human rights 
approach to the environment, namely, the uncertainty surrounding the 
“qualitative” definition of the rights, the potential for an 
anthropocentric focus that does not respect the intrinsic value of 
ecological services or biodiversity, and the possibility that any new 
rights could be “redundant” and “add little to what already exists in 
                                            
37 R v Grayson and Taylor [1997] 1 NZLR 399 (CA) at 407; Rishworth (n 33) 
421. 
38 [1995] 1 NZLR 700. 
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international law”.39 However, they also noted relevant court decisions 
and observed that these could be seen as “a guarantee of effective 
remedies”.40 Overall, Birnie and Boyle considered that procedural rights 
provided the “strongest” argument for a right to a clean environment 
enabling:41 
 
… individuals and NGOs to enforce domestic environmental law and … 
help them shape domestic environmental policy … public interest 
litigation may also diminish problems of anthropocentricity to the extent 
that rights can be exercised on behalf of the environment or of its non-
human components, and not solely for human benefit. They can also be 
employed in the interests of future generations. A further advantage of 
such litigation is that it can serve as a means of making public bodies 
accountable for their action under international law. 
 
In the New Zealand context, the right to participate in environmental 
decision-making has also been underscored by the Supreme Court in 
Discount Brands Ltd v Westfield (New Zealand) Ltd, where Elias CJ 
observed that a “decision not to notify an application is an exception to 
the general policy of the Act that better substantive decision-making 
results from public participation”, and Keith J emphasized the courts 
“gatekeeping” role where access to justice under s 27 of the NZBORA 
in engaged and requires “anxious” scrutiny of local authority decisions 
on judicial review.42 
III PROPERTY RIGHTS 
This section analyses the role of property rights, for example, quiet 
enjoyment, in promoting the sustainable management of natural and 
physical resources. 
Quiet enjoyment 
                                            
39  Patricia Birnie and Alan Boyle International Law & the Environment (2nd ed, 
Oxford University Press, New York, 2002) 256–259. 
40  Birnie and Boyle 260; MC Mehta v Union of India (1997) 2 SCC 353; Lopez 
Ostra (n 28); Guerra (n 27); Powell and Rayner (n 29). 
41  Birnie and Boyle (n 39) 264. 
42 [2005] NZSC 17 at [25] and [54]. 
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The European Court of Human Rights has also considered nuisance 
complaints “caused by adjacent commercial activity” in the context of 
the protection of property under art 1 of the First Protocol to the 
ECHR,43 that guarantees “peaceful enjoyment” of property and 
safeguards against compulsory acquisition otherwise than in 
accordance with due process, subject to the general ability of the state 
to regulate in the public interest. While the Court has held that land 
use controls imposed under planning restrictions “constitute measures 
of control on the use of property” caught by art 1,44 it has nevertheless 
found such controls to be “permissible” when imposed by regulations 
that are demonstrated to be necessary and in the public interest.45 
Generally, art 1 requires that “a fair balance” should be struck 
“between the individual interest and the general interest”,46 which 
implies “a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the 
means employed and the aim pursued” while affording “a wide margin 
of appreciation” for the state in terms of selecting regulatory 
methods.47 The New Zealand courts have adopted a similar approach 
when balancing the rights affirmed and protected by the NZBORA.48 
Beyond that, there is a strong New Zealand tradition of neo-liberal 
academic literature based on the US takings doctrine advocating for 
the constitutional recognition of property rights.49 These arguments 
have not found traction with the courts,50 but this appears to be more 
of a reaction against neo-liberal theory than an unwillingness to apply 
                                            
43 Ovey and White (n 27) 284. 
44 Pine Valley Developments Ltd v Ireland (1992) 14 EHRR 319; Clare Ovey 
and Robin CA White 371. 
45 Ovey and White (n 27) 373. 
46 Ovey and White (n 27) 372. 
47 Chassagnou v France (2000) 29 EHRR 615, para 75. 
48 Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9 (CA). 
49 Philip A Joseph “Property rights and environmental regulation” in Trevor 
Daya-Winterbottom (ed) Frontiers of Resource Management Law (Thomson 
Reuters, Wellington, 2012) 124-143; Suri Ratnapala “Environmentalism 
Versus Constitutionalism: A Contest Without Winners” [2007] RM Theory & 
Practice 110. 
50 Waitakere City Council v Estate Homes Ltd [2006] NZSC 112. 
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property law concepts (for example, non-derogation from grant) in an 
environmental law context.51 
Richard Epstein, however, provided a valuable insight regarding the US 
takings doctrine, namely, that under both the US and New Zealand 
legal systems compensation is generally payable where “the 
government occupies somebody’s land and takes it for public use”, and 
that where regulation “merely restricts the use of land” compensation 
will generally not be payable.52 Focusing on land use regulation, he 
also found that both legal systems recognize that some relief should be 
provided where land use restrictions “deprive” the owner “of all 
economically viable use” – for example, under s 85(3) of the RMA the 
Environment Court has the power to direct local authorities to delete or 
replace any proposed district rules that would have such an effect.53 
Beyond that, Epstein also noted that while land use restrictions can 
“disrupt” and “distort” the market, regulators will not be immune from 
public opinion “as their inefficiencies can lead to political backlash”.54 
For example, the Far North District Council adopted a prescriptive 
approach by mapping significant natural areas on private land 
(approximately 17 per cent of the district) and notified proposed rules 
that proscribed felling indigenous forest trees on the affected 
properties without resource consent. The failure of the district council 
to address concerns expressed by submitters regarding the quality of 
the data used for mapping, and misconceptions about the nature of 
property rights ultimately led to the proposed plan being withdrawn in 
1998 two years after notification.55 
Separately, Eduardo Peñalver focused on the “complexity of land” in 
his critique of the “traditional law and economics discussions of the 
                                            
51 Hampton v Canterbury Regional Council [2016] NZSC 30. 
52 Richard A Epstein Natural Resource Law & Property Rights and Takings 
(New Zealand Business Roundtable, Wellington, 1999) 38. 
53 Epstein (n 52) 38. 
54 Epstein (n 52) 44. 
55 Neil Ericksen and others Planning for Sustainability: New Zealand under the 
RMA (International Global Change Institute, University of Waikato, 
Hamilton, 2001). 
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ownership of land”.56 In particular, he observed that “land has 
memory” which affects our views about property and investment 
decisions through both perceptions about land use change (e.g. 
whether a particular site is used as a landfill or a church), and through 
historic settlement patterns that can remain in place long after any 
“locational advantages have been dissipated” and influence future 
development decisions.57 For example, Peñalver noted that:58 
… sprawled out, low density residential neighborhoods built around 
automobile use and cheap gasoline will be extremely difficult to dislodge 
once fuel becomes expensive or the technology of personal 
transportation shifts away from the car. 
There is, however, a convergence between these divergent views 
about property rights, in that most commentators generally agree that 
property rights are constitutionally important. For example, while Barry 
Barton considered that there is a legitimate role for land use 
regulation, he found that the power to regulate under the RMA is 
balanced by the protection offered to affected owners via the provision 
of submission, hearing, and appeal rights regarding proposed rules59 – 
including their ability to challenge the rational basis for proposed rules 
under s 32 or to seek that proposed rules should be deleted or 
replaced under s 85. In particular, Barton categorized the protection 
offered by these provisions as being “constitutional” in nature, and 
considered that compensation should be payable where these 
participation rights are eroded by regressive simplifying and 
streamlining statutory amendments.60 
Similarly, David Kirkpatrick noted that perverse results can occur 
where property rights are not properly understood, for example, where 
                                            
56 Eduardo M Peñalver Land Virtues (Yale Legal Theory Workshop, New Haven, 
2009) 1. 
57 Peñalver (n 56) 10-12. 
58 Peñalver (n 56) 12. 
59 RMA, sch 1. 
60 Barry Barton “The legitimacy of regulation” in Trevor Daya-Winterbottom 
(ed) Frontiers of Resource Management Law (Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 
2012) 144-190. 
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trees are felled before they reach the size where regulatory protection 
would apply.61 In particular, Kirkpatrick (based on the writings of 
Jeremy Waldron) was concerned that “exchange” and “income” rights 
are not fully recognized by local authorities when preparing district 
rules.62 Likewise, Epstein also emphasized that the “bundle” of 
property rights recognized under English derived common law includes 
the ability to possess, use, and dispose of property.63 
Other commentators have focused on the peculiar characteristics of 
natural resources (e.g. freshwater). For example, the moral 
philosopher, Mary Warnock, questioned whether absent concepts of 
common property we can feel the same responsibility for what we do 
not own, and suggested that only “Promethean fear” of adverse effects 
can promote responsibility for the environment.64 Whereas, Daniel 
Bromley, from a law and economics perspective considered that some 
form of ownership is the key to responsibility, while the type of 
ownership adopted (e.g. private or common) should reflect the values 
and traditions of the particular society promulgating the regulations.65 
While Joseph Sax noted the need to define property-like entitlements 
in the context of permits for the take and use of freshwater – which 
remains a contentious issue in regions where freshwater bodies are 
nearing full allocation.66 In contrast, Danny Nicol argued that defining 
property as a human right could be described as the “fundamental 
right of the well-to-do” and perceived as an “insurance policy” to 
preserve neo-liberal policies.67 Beyond that, Eric Freyfogle 
                                            
61 David Kirkpatrick “Property rights: Do you have any?” in Trevor Daya-
Winterbottom (ed) Frontiers of Resource Management Law (Thomson 
Reuters, Wellington, 2012) 93-123. 
62 Kirkpatrick (n 61) 96; Jeremy Waldron The Right to Private Property 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988). 
63 Epstein (n 52) 41. 
64 Mary Warnock Critical Reflections on Ownership (Edward Elgar Publishing, 
Cheltenham, 2015) 142. 
65 Daniel W Bromley Property Rights and the Environment: Natural Resource 
Policy in Transition (Ministry for the Environment, Wellington, 1988). 
66 Joseph L Sax “Our precious water resources: learning from the past, 
securing the future” [2009] RM Theory & Practice 30. 
67 Danny Nicol The Constitutional Protection of Capitalism (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2010) 128-151. 
IUCN Academy of Environmental Law 14th Colloquium University of Oslo Norway 20-25 
June 2016  
 
 16 
acknowledged the need for a proper understanding of property rights, 
but argued that property rights need to be redefined to reflect the 
societal shift implicit in the requirement to promote the sustainable 
management of natural and physical resources in an “ecologically 
sound” way.68 
Separately, Alex Frame suggested that the property rights debate has 
provided the catalyst for developing New Zealand jurisprudence on 
property – liberating views about legal personality.69 This has arisen as 
a response to the commercialization or privatization of hydro electricity 
and other assets divested by the state during the period since 1984, 
and the resulting “commodification” of the natural and physical 
resources used by the new owners.70 For example, Frame observed 
that:71 
Not surprisingly, the Maori reaction has been: if it is property, then it is 
our property! 
Frame based his thesis on the analysis of the New Zealand jurist, John 
Salmond, who articulated a broad “conception of personality” that 
recognizes “persons who are not men”.72 He then extended this 
concept to “geographical features” of significance to Maori (e.g. rivers 
and mountains) because they are “seen as tupuna” or ancestors, that 
he considered “do not lend themselves to allocation as property 
without engendering feelings of dispossession”.73 This led Frame 
(inspired by Polynesian custom and the writings of Christopher Stone) 
to suggest that rivers and other geographic features could be given 
                                            
68 Eric T Freyfogle “Taking Property Seriously” in David Grinlinton and Prue 
Taylor (eds) Property Rights and Sustainablity (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Leiden, 2011) 43-61. 
69 Alex Frame “Property and the Treaty of Waitangi” in Janet McLean (ed) 
Property and the Constitution (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1999) 236-238. 
70 Frame (n 69) 234. 
71 Frame (n 69) 234. 
72 Frame (n 69) 236. 
73 Frame (n 69) 237. 
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legal personaility, with persons being appointed to speak on their 
behalf.74 
IV CULTURAL RIGHTS 
This section analyses the role of cultural rights, for example, 
kaitiakitanga or the exercise of guardianship by Maori in accordance 
with customary values and practices in relation to natural and physical 
resources, in promoting sustainable management. 
Rule of law for nature 
Whata noted the strong ecological approach in New Zealand 
environmental law writing that “maintains” the normative value of 
sustainable management as an “ethic” that “should guide our actions” 
in a similar way to the influence of the concept of justice on the law 
generally.75  Internationally, Jordi Jaria i Manzano considered the 
“paradigm shift” achieved by the Ecuadorian constitution when 
incorporating the rights of nature. He noted that indigenous concepts 
providing for “good living” pervade the document, and that specific 
provision is made to respect nature (Pacha Mama – Mother Earth) and 
its reproductive, regenerative and evolutionary processes, and for the 
restoration of nature as part of the “constitutional obligations of 
Ecuadorian citizens”.76 Manzano noted the arguments against 
expanding rights beyond humans to nature and giving nature legal 
personality, but considered that expanding constitutional rights in this 
way is consistent with Latin American traditions in legal philosophy and 
“using the constitution as a tool for social transformation”.77 However, 
he criticised the methods used to incorporate the rights of nature in 
                                            
74 Frame (n 69) 237. 
75 Whata (n 2) [29]; Peter Salmon “Sustainable Development in New Zealand” 
in Trevor Daya-Winterbottom (ed) Justice and the Environment (1st edn, 
Resource Management Law Association, Auckland, 2007) 19 and 21. 
76 Jordi Jaria i Manzano “The rights of nature in Ecuador: and opportunity to 
reflect on society, law and environment” in Robert V Percival, Jolene Lin and 
William Piermattei (eds) Global Environmental Law at a Crossroads (Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham 2014) 49-51. 
77 Manzano (n 76) 53. 
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the constitution because, by “humanising” nature, the constitutional 
provisions do not achieive the desired objective of protecting nature – 
but, instead, reduce “nature to just one among many complex and 
competing interests thereby diminishing rather than raising its 
importance”.78 Notwithstanding these concerns, Manzano considered 
that the positive effect of the Ecuadorian constitution is the cultural 
shift from a western to an indigenous world-view of nature:79 
… because looking at non-Western cultures seems to be the best way of 
moving from a constitutionalism based on rights to a constitutionalism 
based on responsibilities; that is, from the (ab)use of nature to the 
respect and care for nature. 
The New Zealand based academic, Joel Colón-Rios, also considered the 
rights to nature in the Ecuadorian constitution. He reflected on the 
case of the Vilcabamba River where spoil from new road works 
constructed by the provincial government was deposited in the river 
and protective action was taken by third parties, on behalf of the river, 
based on the rights to nature in art 71 of the constitution. The 
Provincial Court applied a reverse burden of proof, requiring the 
provincial government to prove that the road works had not caused 
any environmental harm. The plaintiffs succeeded, and the Court made 
orders for a remediation and rehabilitation plan to be prepared and 
gave directions about how the works should be completed. 
Notwithstanding the decision, the outcome of the case was not entirely 
successful as the remediation and rehabilition plan was not 
implemented. However, Colón-Rios observed that the real success of 
the case was that:80 
… it opened an avenue that did not exist before, that is, it showed that 
the rights of nature are susceptible of judicial application in ordinary and 
local contexts. 
                                            
78 Manzano (n 76) 57. 
79 Manzano (n 76) 62. 
80 Joel I Colon-Rios “On the theory and practice of the rights of nature” in Paul 
Martin and others (eds) The Search for Environmental Justice (Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham 2015) 130. 
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Beyond that, Fisher also drew attention to the rights to nature in art 71 
of the Ecuadorian constitution, and emphasized the power provided by 
this provision that enables any person to “call upon public authorities 
to enforce the rights of nature”, together with the duty in art 83 of the 
constitution “to respect the rights of nature, preserve a healthy 
environment and use natural resources rationally, sustainably and 
durably”.81 As a result, he found that “nature” has been given legal 
personality and imbued with rights, that are “capable” of enforcement 
via the combination of rights and duties in arts 71 and 83 of the 
constitution.82 
Guardianship 
Maori cultural values also intersect with resource management as a 
result of the settlement of indigenous grievances under the Treaty of 
Waitangi Act 1975. For example, the Waikato-Tainui Raupatu Claims 
(Waikato River) Settlement Act 2010 built on the Maori concept of 
kaitiakitanga by appointing guardians to prepare a vision and strategy 
for the river catchment, that articulates Maori customary values and 
practices and gives legal effect to them as part of the regional policy 
statement prepared under the RMA. In addition, the statute also 
provides for co-governance by providing Maori with a decision-making 
role together with the local authorities responsible for administering 
the RMA in the Waikato region. These developments are part of a trend 
that has emerged gradually since the 1970s by applying the concept of 
guardianship initially to lakes and fiords,83 and more generally by 
establishing the office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment (PCE) as guardian for the New Zealand environment via 
the right to be heard in any proceedings concerning applications for 
environmental consents, and by affording special constitutional status 
                                            
81 Douglas Fisher Legal Reasoning in Environmental Law (Edward Elger 
Publishing, Cheltenham, 2013) 282. 
82 Fisher (n 81) 282. 
83 Conservation Law Reform Act 1990; Fiordland (Te Moana o Atawhenua) 
Marine Management Act 2005. 
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to the PCE as an officer of Parliament.84 The right to be heard in 
proceedings has not, however, been exercised to date. 
More recently, the Maori concept of kaitiakitanga has been expanded 
further to provide for guardianship, co-governance and the transfer of 
legal title to the mountain ranges of the Te Urewera national park to 
Maori, and the recognition of the mountains as legal persons.85 
Similarly, the Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Bill 
2015, currently before select committee in Parliament, recognizes the 
river catchment as a legal person, imposes a duty on all persons to 
recognize and provide for the river and its associated values, and 
enables the river to have legal standing and an independent voice via 
two guardians who are to be appointed by the Crown and Maori to act 
on behalf of the river.  
These development also build on the writings of Frame, Manzano, and 
Colon-Rios noted above, and could potentially provide the basis for 
expanding the concept of kaitiakitanga or guardianship even further as 
the foundation for indigenous earth governance (similar to the 
provisions in the Ecuadorian constitution) based on Papatuanuku, 
Mother Earth from Maori tikanga. 
Additionally, Joseph Williams has also provided valuable insights 
regarding the fusion of the English based common law with Maori 
tikanga (customary values and practices)86 to create a distinctive New 
Zealand jurispridence in the spheres of both public and private law.87 
For example, in Tamaki v Maori Women’s Welfare League, the High 
                                            
84 Environment Act 1986, s 4 and s 21; Gary Hawke (ed) Guardians for the 
Environment (Institure of Policy Studies, Wellington, 1997); David Young 
Keeper of the Long View: Sustainability and the PCE (Parliamentary 
Commissioner for the Environment, Wellington, 2007); Joseph 383-384 and 
395-399. 
85 Te Urewera Act 2014, s 11; Rachael Harris “A legal identity for Te Urewera: 
The changing face of co-governance in the central North Island” [2015] RM 
Theory & Practice 148. 
86 RMA, s 2(1). 
87 Joseph Williams (presentation at Resource Management Law Association 
Annual Conference, Wellington, 1-3 October 2009), cited in “Editorial 
Introduction” [2010] RM Theory & Practice 5. 
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Court on judicial review found that “consistency with the wider values 
and practices of tikanga” was relevant in relation to decision-making 
by an incorporated society;88 and in Takamore v Clarke, the Court of 
Appeal found that executors were subject to a broad “requirement to 
consider tikanga Maori and other important cultural, spiritual and 
religious values” when deciding where a deceased Maori person should 
be buried.89 Similarly, both Loughlin and Tipene O’Regan have noted 
that the foundations of English common law and Maori tikanga are 
based on custom, practical knowledge and experience.90 In particular, 
O’Regan advocated for a pragmatic view of Maori tikanga and observed 
that:91 
In my view it is the capacity for dynamic adaptation which is the 
particular genius of Maori culture and associated values. I believe that 
this is powerfully demonstrated in Maori traditional history as well as in 
our more recent historical experience. I take the view that we should 
follow the historical precent of our tupuna and permit our values to 
flourish in accordance with the changing environment and the expansion 
of human knowledge and capacity. 
Beyond that, Whata also considered that kaitiakitanga has a common 
law dimension.92 For example, he noted strong arguments for the 
proposition that the statutory purpose of sustainable management in s 
5 of the RMA incorporates international norms, and that the duty to 
have regard to kaitiakitanga in s 7(a) of the RMA infers that the 
exercise of guardianship arises independent of statute law as a 
customary environmental right.93 
V RIGHTING ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
                                            
88 [2011] NZHC 688 at [70]. 
89 [2013] 2 NZLR 733 at [255]. 
90 Loughlin (n 1) 195; Trevor Gould and Trevor Daya-Winterbottom “Blood, 
Sweat, and Fears” [1999] NZLJ 342 at 343. 
91 Cited in [1999] NZLJ 342 at 343. 
92 Whata (n 2) [56]. 
93 Whata (n 2) [22]-[36] and [57]. 
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This section critically explores how a rights based approach to 
environmental conflict resolution could be implemented under New 
Zealand law to give effect to international environmental law 
principles. 
Constitionality and constitutional statutes 
May and Daly found that a combination of access to information, 
participation in decision-making and standing to pursue remedies are 
the cornerstone for achieving environmental protection.94 More 
critically, they argued that environmental procedural rights “can be 
severely curtailed” when provided for under national legislation, and 
expressed a clear preference for the constitutional guarantee of 
procedural rights.95 Providing such guarantees will therefore be 
problematic in states, such as New Zealand, that rely on an unwritten 
constitution. 
Some commentators have sought to resolve this problem by classifying 
certain statutes as constitutional statutes. For example, Scott 
Stephenson and Rivka Weill defined constitutional statutes as laws that 
affect “a fundamental constitutional feature of a constitutional system” 
that are enacted via the ordinary law making process in a common law 
evolutionary fashion.96 In the New Zealand context, Philip Joseph has 
classified the Official Information Act 1982, the Human Rights Act 
1993, and the Citizens Initiated Referenda Act 1993 as “pre-eminently 
constitutional” based on their objectives of ensuring access to 
information, promoting equality of opportunity and participatory 
                                            
94 James R May and Erin Daly “The Future We Want and constitutionally 
enshrined procedural rights in environmental matters” in Robert V Percival, 
Jolene Lin and William Piermattei (eds) Global Environmental Law at a 
Crossroads (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2014) 47. 
95 May and Daly (n 94) 37-38. 
96 Scott Stephenson “Quasi-Constitutionality and the Question of 
Convergence” (paper presented to the Global Symposium on Quasi-
Constitutionality and Constitutional Statutes, Victoria University of 
Wellington, 19-20 May 2016) 2; Rivka Weill “Exploring Constitutional 
Statutes in Common Law Systems” (paper presented to the Global 
Symposium on Quasi-Constitutionality and Constitutional Statutes, Victoria 
University of Wellington, 19-20 May 2016). 
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democracy.97 Similarly, Prue Taylor considered the role of the RMA as 
implementing legislation in relation to New Zealand’s international 
environmental law obligations “that came into force prior to, and 
following, its 1991 enactment”.98 Arguably, based on David Boyd’s 
analysis of the general protection given to environmental rights by the 
majority of UN member states via constitutional provisions, domestic 
legislation, judicial decisions, and ratification of multi-lateral 
environmental agreements,99 the RMA is constitutionally significant. 
Geoffrey Palmer also observed that “constitutionalising” environmental 
protection may provide a way of reconciling the tensions between 
conservation and development,100 and advocated for the adoption of a 
right to environmental quality enforced by directive statutes based on 
art 24 of the South African constitution. In particular, Palmer 
considered that South African case law on art 24 would provide 
valuable persuasive authority for interpreting environmental rights 
included in the proposed written constitution for New Zealand.101 
For example, the impact of art 24 can be illustrated by reference to 
three cases. First, in Save the Vaal the transformative character of the 
constitution was observed by noting that it ushered in a new 
“ideological climate”.102 Second, the BPSA decision recognized the 
                                            
97 Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (4th 
edn, Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2014) 265. 
98 Prue Taylor “The relevance of International Environmental Law for Domestic 
Law” in Peter Salmon and David Grinlinton (eds) Environmental Law in New 
Zealand (Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2015) 298; Ramsar Convention 
1971; Convention on Biological Diversity 1992; Framework Convention on 
Climate Change 1992; Kyoto Protocol 1997. 
99 David R Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of 
Constitutions, Human Rights and the Environment (University of British 
Columbia Press, Vancouver, 2012). 
100 Geoffrey Palmer “The Resource Management Act Reforms: A return to 
Unbridled Power?” (paper presented to Environmental Defence Society 
Conference, Auckland, 7 August 2013) 12. 
101 Geoffrey Palmer and Andrew Butler A Consitution for Aotearoa New Zealand 
(Victoria University Press, Wellington, 2016) The proposed Constitution: the 
full text, A Note on Sources. 
102 Director, Mineral Development v Save the Vaal Environment (1999) 
Butterworths Constitutional Law Reports 8, 845 at para 20; Fisher (2013), 
313. 
IUCN Academy of Environmental Law 14th Colloquium University of Oslo Norway 20-25 
June 2016  
 
 24 
redundancy of purely economic approaches to development, and firmly 
adopted the requirement to “balance” ecological and economic and 
social needs.103 Third, the approach to statutory interpretation in Fuel 
Retailers recognized the constitutionality of legislation enacted to give 
effect to the environmental rights in art 24.104 However, while Douglas 
Fisher observed that these decisions emphasize the duty accepted by 
the courts “to uphold the constitution”,105 the prevailing view of other 
commentators is that art 24 of the South African constitution has had 
no real impact on shaping legal rules - because the Constitutional 
Court has failed to clarify sufficiently the scope and content of the 
environmental rights, and because there has been insufficient litigation 
as a result.106 
The impact of litigation on developing jurisprudence is important. For 
example, Palmer stressed the importance of litigation in relation to the 
statutory purpose of promoting sustainable management in s 5 of the 
RMA when he observed that:107 
Once an appropriate case reaches the New Zealand Court of Appeal, it 
can confidently be predicted that a suitably progressive yet workable 
approach will be taken to the Act. The Court has a sound record on 
environmental issues. It has increasingly shown itself to be capable of 
dealing effectively with the challenge of crafting broad principle into 
workable judicial tests, a task at which it has excelled in the cases 
under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
                                            
103 BPSA (Pty) Ltd v Minister (2004) South Africa 2004 (5) 124 at 144; Fisher 
(2013), 314. 
104 Fuel Retailers Association of South Africa v Director-General - 
Environmental Management, Department of Agriculture, Conservation and 
Management (2007) Butterworths Constitutional Law Reports 10, 1059 at 
para 40; Fisher (2013), 315. 
105 Fisher (n 81) 319. 
106 Lael K Weis “Understanding the Constitutional Function of Directive 
Principles: The Role of Directive Legislation” (paper presented to the Global 
Symposium on Quasi-Constitutionality and Constitutional Statutes, Victoria 
University of Wellington, 19-20 May 2016) 14; Michael Kidd “Public Interest 
Environmental Litigation: Recent Cases Raise Possible Obstacles” (2010) 13 
Potchefstroom Elec LJ 27. 
107 Geoffrey Palmer Environment: The International Challenge (Victoria 
University Press, Wellington, 1995) 173. 
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But notwithstanding this confidence, only three significant cases have 
to date been decided by the courts regarding the approach to 
sustainable management under the RMA.108 
Additionally, Lael Weis drew attention to the right to property in art 25 
of the South African constitution in terms of the workability of the 
environmental rights in art 24,109 and both Fisher and Weis drew 
attention to “interpretive” provisions in art 39 that impose obligations 
to promote constitutional values and require other laws to be applied in 
a consistent way – raising the spectre of declarations of 
inconsistency.110 Most recently, in the New Zealand context in Taylor v 
Attorney-General Heath J held that the High Court has jurisdiction to 
make a declaration of inconsistency, notwithstanding the fact that 
NZBORA is not supreme law, and stated that:111 
… I take the view that the existence of this legislation manifests an 
acceptance by Parliament that a judicial tribunal can appropriately state, 
in a formal way, that legislation passed by it is inconsistent with a right 
affirmed or guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. 
This is a significant common law development, particularly when read 
together with the environmental rights in art 105 of the proposed 
written constitution for New Zealand.112 
Common laws of the environment 
From a New Zealand perspective, Sian Elias placed environmental law 
in its wider legal context, in particular its role as “a branch of 
administrative law”.113 Recognising the need for the law to balance 
                                            
108 North Shore City Council v Auckland Regional Council [1997] NZRMA 59 
(NZEnvC); Watercare Services Ltd v Minhinnick [1998] 1 NZLR 294 (NZCA); 
Environmental Defence Society Inc v The New Zealand King Salmon 
Company Ltd [2014] NZSC 38. 
109 Weis (n 106) 15. 
110 Fisher (n 81) 313. 
111 Taylor v Attorney-General [2015] NZHC 1706 at [6], [66], and [73]. 
112 Palmer and Butler (n 101). 
113 Sian Elias “Righting Environmental Justice” (12th Annual Salmon Lecture, 
Auckland, 25 July 2013) at 2. 
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competing demands for procedural fairness, democratic participation, 
and an evidence-based approach to decision-making firmly grounded 
on good science,114 she noted the constitutional advancements made in 
providing for access to information, establishing the office of the 
Ombudsmen to underpin “good administration”, and the importance 
accorded to access to justice from a human rights perspective. She 
observed that:115 
 
People want to know why decisions are taken by others exercising 
public powers which affect them. If they are given the dignity of 
reasons, they want them to justify the conclusion. 
 
Expressing some “sympathy” for the suggestion “that the judiciary 
should not be placed in the position of having to determine values or 
policy”,116 she noted that there are critical differences between human 
rights adjudication and environmental conflict resolution, as human 
rights are expressed in qualified terms that are underpinned by a 
sound theoretical basis and both “international and comparative 
jurisprudence”:117 
 
By contrast, environmental conflict is intrinsically much more difficult to 
resolve if the ends in view are not ordered in any way that provides a 
handle for decision-makers, as by setting minimum standards which do 
confer rights of enforcement. At-large judicial balancing may be at best 
unconvincing and at the worst may mask political judgments which 
cannot be adequately justified by reference to legal standards and which 
should be directly taken by those who are politically accountable. 
 
Previously, Elias emphasized the need for “organizing principles” while 
noting the inherent constraints of the common law in developing 
“statements of over-arching principle” from the mass of case law 
generated by pragmatic and sporadic litigation. She also noted the 
                                            
114 Elias (n 113) 2-3, referring to Robin Cooke “Forward” in Kenneth Palmer 
Planning and Development Law in New Zealand (2nd ed, Law Book 
Company, Sydney, 1984). 
115 Elias (n 113) 5. 
116 Elias (n 113) 13. 
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dynamic nature of the common law, its organic development over time 
in parallel with “the history of the country and its people”, and the 
need to discard principles that are no longer relevant – observing 
that:118 
Legal method comprises discovering the principle that convinces, while 
providing certainty balanced with justice that moves with the times. 
Subsequently, Elias emphasized the need for courts to create 
jurisprudence to guide future disputes.119 While Lord Carnwath mapped 
the general judicial response to “environmental challenges” and 
concluded that despite differing legal frameworks “many of … their 
solutions are of universal application”,120 and that: 
The emerging principles can be seen as the foundation of a system of 
‘common laws of the environment’. 
He drew particular attention to the decision in Telstra Corporation v 
Hornsby Shire Council,121 where Chief Justice Brian Preston of the New 
South Wales Land and Environment Court outlined six basic principles, 
namely: 
! Sustainable use; 
! Integration of economic and environmental considerations; 
! Precautionary principle; 
! Equity (including inter-generational equity); 
! Conservation of biological diversity; 
! Internalization of environmental costs. 
                                            
118 Sian Elias “Foreword” in Rick Bigwood (ed) Legal Method in New Zealand 
(Butterworths, Wellington, 2001) vi. 
119 Cited in Environment Court of New Zealand Annual Review 2015 
(Environment Court of New Zealand, Auckland, 2016) 29. 
120 MC Mehta v Union of India [1998] 6 SC 63 (CNG buses); Oposa v Factoran 
GR No 101083 (SC 30 July 1993) (Phil) (Minors’ case). 
121 (2006) 146 LGERA 10. 
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This led Lord Carnwath to observe that: 
Although derived from the interpretation of local legislation, these 
principles are of much wider application and can be found in other 
jurisdictions in both law and policy. 
For example, Ceri Warnock and Nicola Wheen surveyed the suite of 
New Zealand environmental law statutes and arrived at a similar 
conclusion to Preston CJ.122 They identified the following principles: 
sustainable development, the precautionary principle, the polluter pays 
principle, Treaty of Waitangi principles regarding indigenous rights, and 
procedural rights. While David Sheppard identified, sustainable 
management, administrative justice, proportionality, and equity 
(including “siting equity” that seeks to avoid locating hazardous 
activities in economically disadvantaged areas) as “fundamental” 
principles in the specific RMA context.123 
Most recently, in Environmental Defence Society Inc v The New 
Zealand King Salmon Co Ltd,124 the Supreme Court was given the 
opportunity to consider the RMA statutory purpose in s 5. The Court 
adopted an ecological approach to sustainable management, and found 
that policy statements and plans can include provisions that are 
directive in nature that must be complied with when lower-level 
instruments are prepared or when resource consent applications are 
decided. In doing so, the Court sanctioned the use of non-negotiable 
environmental bottom lines that require adverse effects on the 
environment to be avoided. But more importantly, the Court 
                                            
122 Ceri Warnock and Nicola Wheen “Introduction” in Brookers Environmental 
Legislation Handbook (Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2014) 6-12; 
Biosecurity Act 1993; Climate Change Response Act 2002; Conservation Act 
1987; Crown Minerals Act 1991; Environment Act 1986; Exclusive Economic 
Zone and Continental Shelf (Environmental Effects) Act 2012; Fisheries Act 
1996; Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996; Marine 
Mammals Protection Act 1978; Marine Reserves Act 1971; Ngai Tahu Claims 
Settlement Act 1996; Subantartic Islands Marine Reserves Act 2014; 
Waikato-Tainui Raupatu Claims (Waikato River) Settlement Act 2010; 
Wildlife Act 1953. 
123 David Sheppard “The Resource Management Act – from principles to 
practice” in Trevor Daya-Winterbottom (ed) Frontiers of Resource 
Management Law (Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2012) at 225. 
124 [2014] NZSC 38. 
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determined that where “directive” provisions are included in policy 
statements or plans, applying an overall broad judgment approach will 
not be appropriate. 
Beyond that, Gitanjali Gill suggested that public interest litigation (such 
as King Salmon) is part of the journey towards ensuring that 
environmental law is effective.125 For example, the Environmental 
Defence Society has played a critical role in the development of New 
Zealand law. For example, Environmental Defence Society Inc v South 
Pacific Aluminium (No 3)126 followed the leading English decision in R v 
Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex parte National Federation of Self-
Employed and Small Businesses Ltd,127 by providing a “flexible” and 
“generous” approach to standing in public law cases and it is now 
axiomatic that:128 
… responsible public interest groups representing a relevant aspect of 
the public interest have a strong case for standing where the decision 
can be expected to have community impact, as in resource 
management cases. 
Overall, rights based approaches arguably provide “a more focused, 
consistent and transparent methodology”.129 
VI CONCLUSIONS 
Rights based approaches to environmental law may radically affect 
how issues are resolved by: 
                                            
125 Gitanjali Gill “Human rights and environmental protection in India: the 
judicial journey from public interest litigation to the National Green 
Tribunal” in Anna Grear and Evadne Grant (eds) Thought, Law, Rights and 
Action in the Age of Environmental Crisis (Edward Elgar Publishing, 
Cheltenham, 2015) 123. 
126 [1981] 1 NZLR 216 (CA). 
127 [1982] AC 617 (HL). 
128 Rick Bigwood Public Interest Litigation (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2006) 85; 
Moxon v Casino Control Authority HC Hamilton M324/99 & M325/99 24 May 
2000 at [105]. 
129 Michael Taggart “Reinventing Administrative Law” in Nicholas Bamforth and 
Peter Leyland (eds) Public Law in a Multi-Layered Constitution (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2003) 326. 
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! Applying objective legal standards, such as proportionality or 
the “reasonable person”, to assist with balancing rights. 
! Setting threshold standards to provide a handle for decision-
makers – that make it explicit when adverse effects are to be 
avoided. 
! Adopting an evidence-based approach to decision-making 
firmly based on good science (including social science). 
! Providing for rights to be exercised on behalf of the 
environment via public interest litigation as a fail-safe to 
ensure effective implementation. 
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